小哥哥心得報告:
1.這是一篇紀錄德國曾經嚴重貨幣通膨造成貨幣失去信用的故事。
原來德國早就走過放棄金本位制度而亂印鈔票的歷史道路了，不愧為西方先發國家。
2.歐美各國後來紛紛放棄金本位貨幣制度，改採浮動匯率，其實也是不得已的，不過可以參考
德國失敗學習，而不必重蹈覆輒實在也是幸運，由此可知，國際已不太可能回到金本位制度
了。
3.台灣經濟規模比較小，如果匯率要穩定，學習德國經驗，管制外匯的確非常重要。
4.德國一戰失敗被各國懲罰鉅額賠償金又必須按期歸還，這無法達成的要求，才會造成德國的
貨幣死亡，導致希特勒崛起。
5.當時掌握德國金融交易的那一群人都是猶太人，在舉國餓死邊緣，還在過著優渥的享受生
活，難過會被德國人憎恨，導致族群被集體大屠殺，只能說悲歎啊。
6.德國當時有立法禁止暴飲暴食，犯禁要坐牢兼罰款1.5萬金馬克，這個觀念一直延續至今。
果然民族共同經歷的苦難，發展出脈絡可循的共識，一代傳一代，代代相傳至今。
7.法國人一直以來都在欺負德國人，難怪二戰時德國人先對法國開槍。
8.各國貨幣制度雖然一直在發展，但是二戰後至今已演變成全球都以美元為價值標準的現況，
其實非常可怖，一旦美國經濟成長或信用出現危機，全世界都會跟著挫塞，各國又只能降
尊紆貴的貨幣競貶，調整浮動匯率，如此平白造成經濟損失，實在很不公平啊。
9. 總歸一句: 可惡的美國佬~~ 可敬的德國佬~~ 可憐的台灣佬!!
原文:
當貨幣死亡-兄弟，能借我一百萬馬克嗎？
When Money Dies
Brother, can you spare a million marks?
作者：亞當·弗格斯福爾斯 Adam Fergusson
無論是聰明的朋友，還是名不見經傳的網站，都告訴我們這本書是存在的。但是，要追蹤《貨幣的消亡》（關於1975年魏瑪德國時期惡性通貨膨脹的權威文本），則完全是另一回事。亞馬遜上的版本要2500美元。美國國會圖書館宣稱這本書永久為“內部借閱。”出版商已經停業。但是我們最終在倫敦找到了亞當·弗格森，他很大方地允許《美國保守派》雜誌出版其經典傑作的縮編版。即使經過縮略，這本書優美的文字和歷史洞察力仍顯而易見，並于現代密切相關。
THE
AGONY OF INFLATION is similar to acute pain—demanding complete attention while it
lasts; forgotten or ignorable when it has gone, whatever scars it may leave
behind. Some such explanation may apply to the strange way in which the
remarkable episode of the Weimar
通貨膨脹引發的劇痛，與急性病頗為相似：發病時需要悉心照料；儘管可能留下各種後遺症，但疼痛一過，往往被人遺忘或忽略。這樣的闡述也許可以解釋著名的魏瑪通脹與當代事件的迥異之處。
This
is not an economic study. This is a morality tale. It goes far to prove the
revolutionary axiom that if you wish to destroy a nation you must first corrupt
its currency. Thus must sound money be the first bastion of a society’s defense.
這不是一堂經濟課，而是一篇道德故事。它成功地證明了一條公理：如果你想破壞一個國家，必須首先摧毀它的貨幣。因此，健全的貨幣體系成為社會防禦的第一道屏障。
In
1913, the German mark, British shilling, French franc, and Italian lira were
all worth about a dollar. By 1923, it would have been possible to exchange a
shilling, a franc, or a lira for up to 1,000,000,000,000 marks, although no one
was willing to take marks for anything.
1913年，德國馬克、英國先令、法郎和義大利里拉的面值都與美元大體相當。到了1923年，已經可能用1先令、1法郎，或1里拉兌換到1萬億馬克，沒有人願意持有馬克。
The
inflation was so preposterous that the story has tended to be passed off more
as a historical curiosity than the culmination of economic, social, and
political circumstance of permanent significance. It matters little that the
causes of the Weimar
通貨膨脹太荒謬可笑，人們閱讀這個故事，更多地是為了滿足對歷史的好奇心，而不是將其看做具有重大意義的經濟、社會和政治發展高潮點。
魏瑪通脹的不可複製性、政治條件的差異性，以及金融混亂再次發生的不可思議性，卻幾乎被人們完全忽視。我們必須認識到，任何原因引起的通貨膨脹都會對一個國家（包括政府、人民和社會）造成影響。
If
what happened to the defeated Central
Powers in the early 1920s is anything to go by, then the process of collapse of
the medium of exchange, the currency by which all values are measured, by which social status
is guaranteed, upon which security depends, and in which the fruits of labor
are stored, unleashes such greed, violence, and hatred, largely bred from fear, as no society can survive uncrippled.
如果上世紀二十年代發生在軸心國的事件再次重演，那麼，隨著可信賴的交換媒介的崩潰，作為價值衡量工具、社會地位保證、社會安全保障和勞動成果儲存形式的貨幣，將在人們的恐懼之中，開啟貪婪、暴力和仇恨的大門，所有社會均無法倖免。
Certainly
1922 and 1923 brought catastrophe to the
German bourgeoisie, as well as hunger, disease, destitution, and sometimes
death to an even wider public. Yet any people might have ridden out those years
had they represented one frightful storm
in an otherwise calm passage. What most damaged the morale was that they were
the climax of unreality to years of unimagined strain.
毫無疑問，1922年和1923年使德國中產階級受到了災難性打擊，也給更廣泛的民眾帶來了饑餓、疾病、窮困，甚至死亡。
即使安全渡過的人們也無法以平靜的語氣描述那場可怕的風暴。對士氣打擊最大的是，他們曾處於現實破滅的頂點，承受了難以想像的壓力。
To
ascribe the despair entirely to inflation would be misleading. Undoubtedly,
though, inflation aggravated every evil, ruined every chance of national
revival or individual success, and produced the conditions in which extremists
could raise the mob against the state. It undermined national resolution when
simple want might have bolstered it. Partly because of its unfairly
discriminatory nature, it brought out the worst in everybody. It caused fear
and insecurity among those who had already known too much of both. It fostered
xenophobia. It promoted contempt of government and the subversion of law and
order. It corrupted where corruption had been unknown, and often where it
should have been impossible.
如果把絕望完全歸咎於對通貨膨脹，不免有些以偏蓋全。但毫無疑義，通貨膨脹助紂為虐，毀掉了國家復蘇或個人成功的任何機會，成為滋生極端分子聚眾謀反的土壤。在個人欲望的慫恿下，通貨膨脹削弱了國家意志。在一定程度上，因為其自身不公正的歧視特性，通貨膨脹使人人受害。使處於恐懼和不安狀態中的人們更為驚恐不安。它鼓動排外情緒，
使人蔑視政府，顛覆法律準則。在不為人知的地方，或者本不應該發生之處，貪腐受賄往往大行其道。
Before
1914, the credit policy of the Reichsbank had been governed by the Bank Law of
1875, whereby not less than one-third of the note issue had to be covered by
gold and the remainder by three-month discount bills adequately guaranteed. In
August 1914, action was taken both to pay for the war and to protect the
country’s gold reserves. The
latter objective was achieved by the simple device of suspending the redemption
of Reichsbank notes in gold. The former was contrived by setting up loan banks whose
funds were to be provided simply by printing them. The loan banks would give
credits to business, to the Federal states, to the municipalities, and to the
new war corporations.
1914年以前，德國央行的信貸政策仍參照1875年的銀行法。按規定，與黃金掛鈎的票據發行額不得少於三分之一，
三個月的貼現票據的催款單可得到充分擔保。1914年8月，德國採取措施支付軍費和保護黃金儲備。為完成第二個目標，政府使用了簡單的方法，即暫停贖回德國央行的黃金票據。通過建立貸款銀行來完成第一個目標，而這些銀行僅靠引發紙幣作為資金來源。貸款銀行可以為企業、聯邦政府、市政府和新成立的戰爭公司提供信貸。
Thus
were the government’s
plans drawn up for flnancing the war—not by taxation but by borrowing, with the printing press as
the well to supply both the needs of government and the credit demand for
private business. Only when the war was over, with the veil of censorship
lifted, did it become clear that Germany Germany
這就是德國政府為戰爭籌措資金的計畫，不是通過稅收，而是通過借貸，把印發紙幣作為滿足政府和私人商務信貸需求的源泉。直到戰爭結束，督察制度的的面紗被揭開，德國的經濟災難才與被摧毀的軍事力量一樣，逐漸明晰起來。停戰條約簽訂後的幾個月內，出現了最具毀滅性的貨幣崩潰，在工業國家前所未聞。德國的工業和人力資源遭受重挫，絕望地肩負著難以承受的戰爭賠款重擔。德國不得不將雙腳踏入自己製造的經濟流沙。
The
state of the mark became the barometer both of international confldence in Germany
馬克的現狀，成為國際上對德國的信心和民族絕望的晴雨錶。一戰前，1英鎊相當於20馬克。一戰後，相當於43馬克。在1919年6月凡爾賽條約簽署前，1英鎊可以兌換60馬克。但到了12月，可以兌換到185馬克。
***
“The delirium of milliards
[i.e., billions]” was a
phrase of Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau’s coining. “The majority of statesmen and
flnanciers think in terms of paper,” he wrote. “They sit in their offlces and look at
papers … and on those papers are
written flgures which again represent papers. … A milliard comes easily and
trippingly to the tongue, but no one can imagine a milliard. … Does a wood contain a milliard
leavesfl Are there a milliard blades of
grass in a meadow?”
“譫妄的十億”是德國外交部長沃爾特·拉特瑙杜撰的詞語。“大多數政客和財閥的思考都是基於故紙堆。”他寫道，“他們坐在辦公室，死盯住報表……報表上的數位意味著更多的報表……十億可以輕鬆地脫口而出，但是，沒人能想像出十億有多大……一片樹林包含十億片樹葉？一個牧場有十億根草葉？”
Rathenau
diagnosed that delirium as an affliction not of the people in general—that was to come—but of those who were supposedly in
control of the country’s flnances, who had raised the note circulation since the beginning of
the year from 73 milliard marks to 80 milliard. The mark, at 310 to the pound
in mid-August, had sped downwards to over 400 by mid-September, and was still
going down.
拉特瑙診斷的譫妄症受害者，不是指普通人（儘管他們也將變得譫妄），而是指人們心目中那些控制國家金融的人，那些自新年伊始，將貨幣流通量從730億馬克升至800億的人。8月中旬，310馬克可以兌換1英鎊，但到了9月中旬，匯率急劇下降到400馬克，而且一直在下滑。
The
disease, the German flnancial world seemed to agree, was not containable
without international goodwill and a significant relaxation of the obligations
under the peace treaties. But Germany’s politicians set about relieving the symptoms wherever
possible. The prime minister of Bavaria
德國金融界似乎同意，若沒有國際親善政策，以及和平協約中對賠償責任的重大放鬆，這場疾病將無法緩解。但是，德國的政客們也在著手通過各種途徑減輕疾病則症狀，巴伐利亞州的總理提交了一份法案，將暴飲暴食定為刑事犯罪。暴食者被定義為“慣於享受宴酣之樂的人，可能引起痛苦人群的不滿。” 有人提出，這種人“應該涉嫌被捕，加以拘禁，首犯將被處以最高10萬馬克罰款。”這條法案（使人回想起在奧地利國內，曾以午餐和茶會招待納稅人）從未實施。儘管這只是象徵性的，但德國奸商和蜂擁而至的外國人利用匯率違法謀取私利，將備受尊敬的政治家推到絕望的邊緣。
Politics
were becoming irrelevant: at Christmas 1921, the cost of living had become
people’s only concern. Since
1913, the price of rye bread had risen by 13 times; beef by 17. Sugar, milk,
pork, and potatoes had risen between 23 and 28 times; butter had gone up by 33
times.
政策變得無關緊要：在1921年的聖誕，生活成本成為人們唯一考慮的因素。自1913年以來，黑麥麵包的價格漲了13倍，牛肉漲了17倍。糖、牛奶、豬肉和馬鈴薯的價格漲幅均在23~28倍之間，黃油上漲高達33倍。
It
was natural that people in the grip of raging inflation should look for someone
to blame. In blaming the greed of tourists or the wage demands of labor or the
selflshness of industrialists or the sharpness of the Jews, they were in large
measure still blaming not the disease but the symptoms. A few of the
flnancially sophisticated could be heard blaming the government, but a typical
view was that prices went up because the foreign exchange went up, that the
exchange rate went up because of speculation on the stock exchange, and that
this was obviously the fault of the Jews.
深受通貨膨脹之苦的人們自然而然要尋找始作俑者。責備旅遊者的貪婪、勞動者對工資的需求、企業家的自私，以及咄咄逼人的猶太人的同時，他們很大程度上並未看到頑疾的根源，而只是停留在表面的症狀上。一小部分資深財經學者把原因歸咎於政府的無能，但普遍的觀點認為，價格上揚源于匯率的升高，而匯率的升高則是因為股票交易中的投機行為。由此，顯而易見是猶太人的錯。
By
the spring of 1922, Germany
到1922年春，德國表現出許多民族絕望的跡象。國家的自信心隨財富消逝，與過去一樣，民族道德淪喪，惡俗泛起。安全保障、集體精神和愛國主義沒落，悲觀和不安情緒滋生。當國家組織與倫理價值觀一同搖搖欲墜，通貨膨脹對士氣、物質和社會造成的破壞無可估量，使上訴兩種情形更為惡化，無論是對法國軍國主義和法國本身的抽象憎恨，還是復仇欲望，都不足以使這些歐洲最守法的國民團結一心。
Among
some, the rebirth of the German soul, battered by war, hardship, and
humiliation, was becoming something of an obsession. Not just the militarists
of Frontkflmpfertag and the academics of Kflnigsberg but many of all classes
began to long for a great leader: not a ruler of the type of the Kaiser, but
one possessed of the attributes and Spartan values of the legendary flgures of
early Teutonic history. It was a longing Hitler fully understood. When a nation
is falling apart, its old values challenged by new conditions, there are always
elements who will seize on any means of cohesion.
一些人沉迷於德國靈魂的重生，它曾被戰爭、苦難和屈辱擊得粉碎。不光是前線戰鬥的軍事家和柯尼斯堡的學者們，每個階層的德國人都開始尋找偉大的領袖：不是德國皇帝式的統治者，而是早期日爾曼歷史中出現過的、具有斯巴達價值觀的傳奇人物。希特勒充分理解了這種渴求。當一個國家分崩離析、舊有價值觀面臨著新環境的挑戰之時，總有一些因素會借機對各種形式的凝聚力加以利用。
***
The
rise in prices intensifled the demand for currency, both by the state and other
employers. Private banks could not meet the demand and had to ration the
cashing of checks, so that uncashed checks remained frozen while their
purchasing power drained away. It became impossible to persuade anyone to
accept any description of check, and business came to a standstill. The panic
spread to the working classes when they realized that their wages were simply
not available.
價格上漲加大了國家和雇主對貨幣的需求。私人銀行無法滿足需求，不得不限制支票兌現的額度，無法變現的支票仍被凍結，喪失了自身的購買力。不可能說服人們接受任何形式的支票，商業陷於停滯。當工人階層意識到無法領取工資時，金融領域的恐慌在工人中蔓延開來。
Because
the Reichsbank’s printing presses and
note-distribution arrangements were insufflcient for the situation, a law was
passed permitting, under license and against the deposit of appropriate assets,
the issue of emergency money tokens, or Notgeld, by state and local authorities
and industrial concerns when the Reichsbank could not satisfy needs for wage
payment.
由於德國央行印製貨幣和票據發行體制不足以應對當時的形勢，聯邦和地方政府及工業組織擔心央行不能滿足工資支付的需要，於是通過了一項法律，允許擁有許可的機構依據適量的資產儲備發行緊急代幣券，或稱緊急狀態幣。
Before
long, the tide of emergency money entering local circulation, with or without
the bank’s approval, contrived
enormously to raise the level of the sea
of paper. As the ability to print money privately in a time of accelerating
inflation made possible private proflts only limited by people’s willingness to accept it, the
process merely banked up the inflationary flre to ensure a bigger blaze later
on.
不久以後，緊急貨幣大量湧入地方流通市場。無論是否得到銀行允許，印鈔機構都處心積慮地提高紙幣的供應量。正如私印鈔票的能力一度使通脹程度進一步加深，只有限制人們接受紙幣的願望，才能阻止有人從中牟利，這一過程只會讓通脹之火燒得更旺，此後必然引起熊熊烈焰。
The
mark continued to plummet, but the chancellor would accept no connection
between printing money and its depreciation. Indeed, it remained largely
unrecognized in the cabinet, bank, parliament, or press. The Vossische Zeitung
declared:
馬克仍在暴跌，但總理並不認為印製鈔票和貨幣貶值之間存在聯繫。實際上，內閣、銀行、議會和印鈔機構大都尚未認識到這一點。《福斯報》聲稱：
The
opinion that the flood of paper is the real origin of the depreciation is not
only wrong but dangerously wrong. … Both private and public statistics have long shown that for
the last two years the interior depreciation of the mark is due to the
depreciation of the rate of exchange. … It should be remembered today that our paper circulation,
although it shows a terrifying array of milliards, is really not excessively
high…
有人認為紙幣氾濫是貨幣貶值的真正根源，這種看法不但錯了，而且錯得離譜……一直以來，無論是公共機構還是私人機構的統計資料都顯示，最近兩年來，馬克的內部貶值是由於匯率下降……如今我們不應該忘記，雖然市面流通的紙幣已有數十億，但並沒有大量過剩……
British
ambassador Lord D’Abernon
described these remarkable views as “far from exceptionally retrograde,” and in fact typical of enlightened
Berlin opinion.
英國大使達伯農認為這些言論“絕不僅僅是極大的倒退”，值得注意，它實際上代表了柏林政府的觀點。
A
liter of milk, which cost 7 marks in April 1922, by mid-September cost 26
marks. A Hesse professor lamented that month
that teachers and men of science were no longer given the right to live, and
many would probably die in the coming winter for lack of food and warmth. He
feared that their sons, instead of following their fathers’ careers, would by force of
circumstances turn to manual labor: “Brains no longer have a marketable value. The result can only
be a catastrophe for Germany and the downfall of civilization in central
Europe, if not, indeed, the whole world…”
1922年4月，1升 牛奶的價格是7馬克，到9月中旬其標價為26馬克。赫斯省的一位教授悲歎說，那個月，教師和科學工作者的生存都成了問題，很多人會因為缺衣少食在即將到來的嚴冬喪命。他擔心自己的兒子不能子承父業，將迫於環境轉而從事體力勞動。這位教授說：“智力不再有市場價值。這是德國的災難，中歐文明的倒退，實際上，整個世界將大禍臨頭……”
The
suffering was acute, although worse was to come. Figures issued by the chief
burgomaster of Pankow for 1922 showed that nearly 25 percent of the children
leaving school were below the normal spread of weights and heights, and 30
percent were unflt to work for reasons of health. “Want,” said the burgomaster’s report, “is gradually strangling every feeling
for neatness, cleanness, and decency, leaving room only for thoughts of the
flght with hunger and cold.”
痛苦來得如此之快，不過最糟糕的狀況才剛剛開始。龐科市市長1922年發佈的資料顯示，近25%的輟學兒童的體重與身高低於正常標準，30%的兒童由於身體原因不適合工作。市長在報告中寫道：“人們對整潔有序、大方得體的追求逐漸被生存的需要所取代，只剩下與饑寒交迫殊死搏鬥的念頭。”
The
gold value of money in circulation, equivalent to nearly ￡300 million before the war, had by
November fallen to ￡20
million. The more notes were printed, the lower the value fell. How the
business of the country could be carried on with so small an amount of real
currency mystifled observers and accounted for mounting pressures on the bank
to go on printing. Notes were held for as short a time as possible.
Private-accounts checks were hardly
accepted. Anyone receiving money for goods quickly converted it back
into other goods, and the money never
stopped moving, doing the work of ten times the amount moving a tenth as
fast.
戰前，市面流通的黃金價值接近3億英鎊，而11月以前已跌至2000萬英鎊。紙幣印得越多，金價就跌得越狠。讓觀察家們迷惑的是，一個國家的商業怎樣能以如此少量的現實貨幣運轉，而這也給銀行施加了巨大壓力，促使它們繼續印鈔。人們盡可能縮短持有貨幣的時間。市場很難接受私人帳戶支票。為自身利益著想，每個人都儘快地用鈔票換取其他商品。這樣一來，貨幣就永遠不會停止流動，而且流通速度是此前的十倍。
The
Reichsbank had proclaimed, and was now carrying out, a program of unlimited
printing. More and more presses were employed, and by December the amount
issued was limited only by the capacity of the presses and the physical fatigue
of the printers. Lord D’Abernon reported to London: “The exchange market and the Reichsbank are like a runaway
horse with an incompetent rider—each aggravates the folly of the other.”
德國央行已宣佈將實行無限制的印鈔計畫。越來越多的印鈔機構正在開工。到12月以前，貨幣發行量僅僅受限於印鈔機構的產能和印鈔機使用極限的疲勞。達伯農向英國彙報：“德國的匯率市場和央行就像一匹失控的馬和一個無能的騎手，兩者彼此相互影響，形成惡性循環。”
“By the end of the year,” said Erna von Pustau, “my allowance and all the money I
earned were not worth one cup of coffee. You could go to the baker in the
morning and buy two rolls for 20 marks; but go there in the afternoon and the
same two rolls were 25 marks. … It had somehow to do with the dollar, somehow to do with the stock
exchange—and somehow, maybe, to do
with the Jews.”
愛爾納·馮·普斯達說：“到那年年底，我的補貼和薪酬收入加在一起還不夠買一杯咖啡。早上去麵包店裏還能用20馬克買兩個麵包卷，下午去買同樣的麵包時，兩個要花25馬克了……這種現象和美元有點關係，和股市有些關係，也許，還和猶太人有關。”
Bit
by bit, the star of Hitler began to outshine the medals of Ludendorff. Economic
salvation had become for most people the most pressing need. They were being
turned from politics by the cost of living and low salaries.
慢慢地，希特勒開始成為魯登道夫影響下躥起的一顆新星。對大多數德國人而言，經濟救助已成為最迫切的需求。由於生活成本高、薪水低，他們逐步對政治產生厭倦。
Hitler
alone was capable of trimming his ship to every wind. The middle class was
going Nazi.
希特勒獨自駕駛的航船就能將戰勝所有海上的狂風。德國中產階級正演變為納粹分子。
***
“Inflation is like a drug
in more ways than one,” remarked Lord D’Abernon. “It is
fatal in the end, but it gets its votaries over many difflcult moments.” Hopelessly addicted, the Reichsbank
ploughed on. By 1923, massive unemployment had come and inflation was pursued
more rigorously than ever. Petty crime, the crime of desperation, was
flourishing. Metal plaques on monuments had to be removed for safekeeping. Lead
was beginning to disappear overnight from roofs, and petrol was siphoned from
the tanks of motor cars. A cinema seat cost a lump of coal. With a bottle of
paraffln, one might buy a shirt; with that shirt, the potatoes needed by one’s family.
達伯農勳爵評論道：“通貨膨脹在很多方面看都像是毒品，雖然結局是悲慘的，但卻能幫助癮君子度過艱難時刻。”德國央行無可救藥地繼續著通貨膨脹的毒癮。直到1923年，大量失業情況出現，通脹情況比任何時期都更為囂張。因絕望導致的輕微罪行層出不窮。為安全起見，紀念碑上的金屬瓷片被迫轉移地點。屋頂的導線一夜之間不翼而飛，汽車油箱中的汽油被吸走。一塊煤可以換得影院的一個座位，一瓶石蠟換取一條裙子，而這條裙子又可為另一個家庭換來些土豆。
There
were also stories of shoppers who found that thieves had stolen the suitcases
in which they carried their money, leaving the money behind; and of life
supported by selling every day a single link from a gold crucifix chain. A
5,000-mark cup of coffee would cost 8,000 by the time it was drunk.
購物時，購物者時常發現裝有錢財的手提箱被偷，而錢卻留在原地。靠一環一環地出售黃金十字鏈環過活，一杯標價5000馬克的咖啡在售出時，已經上漲到8000馬克。
In
July 1923, Germany
1923年7月，德國推行一套新的紙幣，包括1000萬馬克，2000萬馬克和5000萬馬克。政治危機已到危急關頭。一家印刷廠員工罷工，用小推車圍住德國央行，討要貨幣。可以說，貨幣還是貨幣，並沒有被取代，但貨幣的價值已經無法衡量，也幾乎不能起到交換媒介的作用。9月1日 德國央行發行了面值50億的紙幣。
The
pervading uncertainty that had smothered the old national spirit was now the
food of extremism. The most moderate persons declared that flrmness—a strong hand—was required. Thus on Sept. 2, 1923,
100,000 demonstrators gathered for the Nazi rally at Nuremburg. Within the
week, speaking flve or six times a day, Hitler was calling for national
dictatorship.
彌漫全國的不確定性已開始侵蝕古老的國魂，成為低端分子的食糧。最溫和的人們在要求強硬、鐵腕。因此，1923年9月2日 ，10萬罷工人員在紐倫堡聚會，支持納粹聯軍。一周之內，希特勒連續五六次號召執行獨裁專政。
By the end of September, the government’s control of the political, let
alone the financial, situation was
strained to the breaking point. So were the ministers: according to the Czech
foreign minister they were so exhausted that they were incapable of real
consideration of the problems, “the decision of which depends on which minister had the most sleep the
night before.” The proclamation of Sept.
19 threatening a month in jail and unlimited fines to anyone who hoarded food
or money, or prevented the paying of taxes, or impeded the distribution of food
was a useless act of desperation: everyone, ministers included, was hoarding
everything; no one made any effort to pay taxes; and the only impediment to the
distribution of food was the lack of currency to pay for it.
在當年9月底，政府對政治（更遑論財經）的掌控已經幾近破裂。部長們的情況也大體相同：據捷克外交部長說，他們心力交瘁，對現存問題無能為力，“決策由前一晚睡眠最充足的部長做出。”9月19日 的公告規定，囤積居奇、妨礙納稅、干擾糧食發放的人，要監禁一個月，並受到巨額罰款，這些做法只是絕望中的徒勞之舉。現實是每個人（包括部長們）都有聚斂錢財，沒有人願意納稅，貨幣短缺阻礙著食物的發放。
On
Sept. 26, Chancellor Stresemann
suspended seven articles of the Weimar
Here,
perhaps, was the strong hand that Germans wanted. There could now be
restrictions on personal liberty. The army and police might interfere at will
with postal, phone services, indulge in house searches, and conflscate
property. Incitement to disobedience could be punished with imprisonment or a
flne of up to 15,000 gold marks. If lives were endangered, the punishment could
be penal servitude.
這或許就是德國人想要的鐵腕。現在，人身自由受到限制，軍隊和警方隨意對郵政和電話加以騷擾、搜查民房、沒收他人財物。煽動別人不服從命令會遭到監禁，或處以高達1.5萬黃金馬克。如果殺人，將被處以勞役拘禁。
Inflation
is the ally of political extremists, the antithesis of order. At other times—in post-revolutionary Russia, in
Kadar’s Hungary—it may have been engendered to
destroy the social order, for chaos is the stuff of revolution. In Germany
通貨膨脹助長了政治極端主義者，他們是社會秩序的破壞者。在歷史的其他時期（大革命後的俄國和卡達爾主政時期的匈牙利），社會秩序可能會遭到破壞，因為混亂是革命的產物。然而在此時的德國，通貨膨脹政策是金融無知、行業貪婪和政治懦弱的結果。1923年，希特勒將希望寄託於“饑腸轆轆的億萬富翁造反”。
When
Schacht was appointed commissioner for national currency on Nov. 13, he faced
incredible disorder. During the previous
ten days, expenditure had exceeded revenue by 1,000 times. The floating debt
had increased 15 times. The budgetary estimates included on every page the
outrageous reminder that all flgures were in quadrillions.
***
The
immediate basis of stabilization was not the closing down of the printing
presses so much as the rigorous disciplining of state expenditure by the
refusal of further credit to the government and by a return from a floating
mark to a flxed parity against gold and the dollar. The government, having put
the screws to the nation and made Schacht president of the Reichsbank for life,
could do little but hope the cure would work.
最迫切的穩定基礎不是關掉印鈔機，而是應該通過拒絕進一步向政府提供貸款，以及恢復馬克與黃金和美元之間的浮動匯率制度，嚴格政府的開支管理。政府無計可施，只能向國家施壓，任命沙赫特為德國央行終身總裁，但此舉收效甚微。
Food
began to appear again in the towns halfway through December. On Christmas Day
1923, Lord D’Abernon wrote of the “magical wand of currency stability.” Sanity had returned to Germany’s flnances, and no doubt 1924, a
period of extreme monetary stringency, consolidated the flnancial recovery. But
it was too much to hope that years of reckless profligacy could be so easily
paid for, or that what the country had passed through would have no lasting
effects on the people’s mind. The economic reckoning was still to come. “After a long devaluation,” Schacht held on Jan. 24, 1924, “stability can only be regained at the
cost of a severe crisis.”
12月中旬，城鎮中又開始出現食品。1923年耶誕節那一天，達伯農勳爵寫下了《貨幣穩定的魔杖》。德國的金融已經回歸理智，毫無疑問，1924年是貨幣緊縮、鞏固金融恢復的極端時期。但是，不能奢望無情揮霍的日子輕易過去，或者國家經歷的風風雨雨不在人們心頭留下創傷。經濟清算即將到來。1924年1月24日 沙赫特堅稱，“在長期的貶值之後，必須付出沉重的危機代價，貨幣才能重新穩定。”
Germany’s trouble was that the inflation boom
had never been liquidated. The country that had undergone every conceivable
form of collapse during the previous six years now crashed downwards just as
she was beginning to rise from her knees. Confldence was shattered. The flow of foreign money
slackened. The Reichsbank policy of credit restriction was maintained as firmly
as ever to counteract a net outflow of gold and foreign exchange. There was
such an alarming rise in the cost of living that to prevent agitation the index
had to be cooked. Much though public works were instituted to try to mop up
labor, the unemployed flgure passed 1,300,000 by December 1925, presenting the
politicians’ nightmare of 1922:
unhidden mass unemployment that the policy of inflation had so largely been
designed to avoid.
德國的問題是，從未對通貨膨脹的虛假繁榮實行清算。在之前的六年，德國遭受了各種可以想像的崩潰方式，就像長跪不起的人開始站立一樣，現在她又垮下去了。信心被粉碎。國外資金匱乏。央行緊縮的信貸政策仍像以往一樣堅定，阻礙了黃金和外匯的淨流出。生活成本上升到令人驚恐的程度，為防止民眾怨聲載道，不得不捏造各項指數。儘管政府開建了很多公共工程，儘量雇傭勞工，但是，1925年失業人數仍超過了130萬人，標誌著政治家們1922年的噩夢重現了：無法掩蓋的大量失業。而原本花大力氣設計的通貨膨脹政策的目的，就是為了避免大量失業。
The
scourge of inflation, it must be emphasized, followed the scourge of defeat in
war, so that one must hesitate to affirm that the psychological trauma of the early 1920s would have been absent but
for the insecurity that endless depreciation of the currency brought. National
disintegration and social upheavals unconnected with the money supply, after
all, are enough to promote ethical degeneration and contempt for old standards
of behavior in any community. It remains the case that those who lived with or
observed the process attributed what they
saw flrst and foremost to inflation: fear, greed, immorality, demoralization, dishonor.
必須要強調的是，通貨膨脹的災難是緊隨戰敗國的身份而來的。所以有一點不得不聲明，儘管20世紀20年代初的心理創傷已經不存在了，但是，貨幣貶值所帶來的不安全感卻一直存在。雖然國家解體和社會巨變與貨幣供應量無關，但在任何社會中，這畢竟足以導致道德的淪喪，以及對傳統行為標準的蔑視。讓經歷或看到整個過程的人們將自己首先看到的都歸咎於通貨膨脹：恐懼、貪婪、不道德、墮落、不名譽。
As
the old virtues of thrift, honesty, and
hard work lost their appeal, everybody was out to get rich quickly, especially
as speculation could yield far greater rewards than labor. While the anonymous,
mindless Reichsbank was prepared to be the dupe of borrowers, no merchant would
have wished to let the opportunities for enrichment slip by while others were
making hay. For the less astute, it was incentive enough, and arguably morally defensible, to take
every advantage of the unworkable fiscal system merely to maintain financial
and social position.
節儉、誠實和努力工作等傳統美德失去了吸引力，尤其當投機的收益遠高於勞動時，每個人都想迅速致富。當人們準備把無名無姓、粗心大意的德國央行當成冤大頭時，沒有商人會在別人未雨綢繆之時，讓致富機會擦身而過。只要有一點點狡詐，就足以獲得豐厚回報。儘管在道德上站不住腳，但他們仍會鑽失靈的財政制度的空子，只為保住自己的金融和社會地位。
As
that position slid away, patriotism, social obligations, and morals slid with it. The air of corruption was general.
Democracy may have survived inflation, but there was little evidence of universal gratitude for that deliverance.
Monarchism was the more popular creed, and it may be that the exposure of
Germany’s moral wounds—the flnancial scandals of the
inflationary years—contributed greatly to the
strengthening of the disciplinarian side of the nation’s character.
隨著這些的地位的丟失，愛國主義、社會責任感和道德一併溜走了。腐敗的空氣四處彌漫。民主或許在通貨膨脹中倖存下來，但是，沒有證據表明，民眾對此心存感激。君主制成了更流行的信條，而且它可能揭開了德國的道德創傷（發生通貨膨脹年份裏的金融醜聞），更有助於加強德國民族性格中嚴格遵守紀律的特性。
Where
did the story end? More than any other thread that links the two world wars,
the history of the inflation is a reminder that the second was an extension of
the first. Inflation for Germany
故事在哪里結束？與連接兩次世界大戰的所有線索相比，通貨膨脹的歷史更能提醒人們，第二次世界大戰是第一次世界大戰的延伸。當發動戰爭的實力恢復時，無意之間，德國的通貨膨脹起到了煽動敵對情緒的作用。不僅以前的富裕生活沒有了，而且，傳統道德倫理受到破壞，使社會的人權支柱蒙羞：在德國人心中，民主與共和已經與金融、社會和政治混亂密切相關，因此，當再次受到混亂威脅時，德國人就尋找最好的替代品。
With
inflation alone, noted Günter Schmolders, can a government extinguish debt without repayment or
wage war and engage in other nonproductive activities on a large scale: it is
not recognized as a tax. Thus did Hitler resume deflcit spending to finance
armaments in 1938, and the experience begin again.
君特·施米爾德斯指出，不用還債，或發動戰爭，以及其他大規模的非生產性活動，單靠通貨膨脹，政府就能夠抹去債務：這不被認定為稅收。因此，希特勒在1938年重新恢復赤字支出，為軍備撥款，以往的經歷再次重演。
To
say that inflation caused Hitler, or them,
that inflation elsewhere could produce other dictatorships, is to wander
into quagmires of irrelevant analogy. Comparable, coincidental circumstances in
Austria and Hungary
那種認為通貨膨脹造就了希特勒（或他們），別國的通貨膨脹會產生其他獨裁政權的說法，是陷入到了毫不相關的類比困境。如果要比較的話，與德國境況類似的奧地利和匈牙利，卻沒有出現同樣的思潮。另一方面，20世紀30年代初龐大的失業人數給了希特勒所需要的選票，而且在通貨膨脹的年份裏，希特勒首先試圖出手扼住德國民主的咽喉，這一點毋庸置疑。通貨膨脹沒有用魔法一樣變出希特勒，但卻成就了希特勒。
***
Money
is no more than a medium of exchange. Only when it has a value acknowledged by
more than one person can it be used. Once
no one acknowledged it, the Germans
learnt, their paper had no value. The discovery that shattered their society
was that the traditional repository of purchasing power had disappeared and
that there was no means left of measuring the worth of anything. For most,
degree of necessity became the sole criterion of value, the basis of
everything. Man’s
values became animal values.
金錢只是交易的媒介。只有在得到不止一個人的認可時，它才有價值。德國人懂得，一旦無人認可了，他們的紙（幣）就失去了價值。撼動了德國社會的發現是，傳統的購買力寶庫消失了，而且沒有方法衡量任何東西的價值。大多數情況下，需要的程度成為了價值的唯一標準，成為每件東西的基礎。人的價值變無異於動物的價值。
When
life is secure, society acknowledges the value of luxuries, those enjoyments
without which life can proceed but which make it much pleasanter. When life is
insecure, values change. Without warmth, a roof, or adequate clothes, it may be
difflcult to sustain life for more than a few weeks. Without food, life can be
shorter still. At the top of the scale, the
most valuable commodities are water and air. For the destitute in Germany
當生命安全時，社會認可奢侈品的價值，它們對生存無益，卻會使生命更加愉快。當生命不安全時，價值觀改變了。沒有溫暖、房屋，或充足的衣服，將生命維持幾周都會很困難。沒有食物，生命會更為短暫。在生命等級的頂端，最有價值的商品是水和空氣。對於貧窮的德國人來說，錢沒有交換的價值，生存與抽象概念極為接近，就像在戰爭中一樣。在《西線無戰事》中，穆勒死後“將他的靴子遺留給了我，同樣地，他也是從克姆裏克那裏繼承來的。我穿著靴子，很合腳，我死了之後，查登會得到靴子：我已經說好要把靴子留給他。”
In
war, boots; in flight, a place in a boat may be the most vital thing in the
world, more desirable than untold millions. In hyperinflation, a kilo of
potatoes was worth more than the family silver. A prostitute in the family was
better than an infant corpse; theft was preferable to starvation; warmth was
flner than honor; clothing more essential than democracy; food more needed than
freedom.
在戰爭中，是靴子；在航行中，是船上的一個座位，相比無人認領的百萬英鎊，它們是世界上更重要、更令人渴望的。在惡性通貨膨脹的情況下，1公斤 土豆好過整個家族的銀器。家裏的妓女好過嬰兒屍體；寧願做賊也不願挨餓；溫暖好過誠實；比起民主，衣服更必不可少；人們需要食物，更甚于自由。
Adam
Fergusson is the author of flve books, has been a Member (for Scotland
亞當·弗格森著有5本書，是歐洲議會成員（代表蘇格蘭），是英國外交部的歐洲顧問。他目前擔任歐洲事務的顧問。